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Introduction 
Lebanon’s existence as an independent state following the end of the French Mandate 
(1920-1943) is one that is nominal. Control over Lebanon, both territory and the 
government, developed into a dynamic conflict which lasted for fifteen years, forcing the 
collapse of state structures, division of territory, dissolution of monopolised coercion, and 
the development of a fragmented economy. Lebanon quickly went from being a weak state 
to a collapsed state at the onset of the Civil War (1975-1990). The central political control of 
Lebanon came to a standstill as various factions took control over territory through the use 
of coercion, developed methods of capital extraction, and entrenched identity constructs 
conducive to maintaining the divisions of the Civil War long after its settlement. Thus the 
Civil War dramatically altered the state in Lebanon, ultimately forcing the Civil War elites to 
renegotiate the state by undertaking a process of state formation.  
State formation can be explained as the product of, or processes related to, religious 
work ethic, elite politics, economic development, institutional diffusion, centralisation of 
social identities, political and territorial stability, colonialism, territorial and political 
isolation, and war1. All of the explanations can be used convincingly depending on the case, 
but three elements resound from these explanations: the role of capital, coercion, and 
identity. Moreover, they highlight the underpinnings of the state through military force and 
internal security; economic extraction and redistribution; and the development of 
nationalist ideologies. While the application of a European model of state formation to 
explain state formation in the developing world is often argued to be over simplistic there is 
also the problem of an argument based on rhetoric of exceptionalism. The arguments 
against applying such theories to the developing world include fear that it would negate 
social, cultural, and political histories that are different from the European experience. 
However, theories are not a means of prediction, but a framework to be employed to help 
social scientists understand global phenomenon. Although these histories are important and 
are markers of difference, there are times when similar conditions are produced in different 
global environments.  
Under these conditions of similarity, I argue that it is possible to use a specific frame 
of reference, or theoretical model, in a generalizable fashion. In doing so, I use Charles Tilly’s 
explanation of state formation to help explain the development and consolidation of the 
Lebanese state after the Lebanese Civil War (1975-1990) and the continuation of state 
formation in the aftermath of Syrian withdrawal (2005) from Lebanon. Specifically, I argue 
that the Civil War and the conditions of war drove the state in Lebanon into a period of 
formation. The paper discusses Tilly’s argument regarding state formation and the various 
ways in which it has been applied to areas exogenous of Europe. It goes on to discuss how 
the Tilly’s argument can be applied to the case of Lebanon and subsequently examines the 
consequences of the Civil War on the Lebanese state and its consolidation; drawing on 
specific examples that highlight the tension of state-formation.  
Tilly and State Formation 
Tilly’s argument regarding state formation in Europe focuses on the development of state 
structures through war and the preparations of warfare. Primarily, it is focused on 
progresses regarding the extraction and redistribution of capital and the monopolisation of 
coercion by rulers. The emergence of state structures related to capital and coercion 
allowed rulers to maintain control over the population within a territorial enclave that could 
be securitised through its coercive forces. Tilly remarks that competition developed over 
trade and territory, with those who controlled the means of coercion attempting to 
maintain and increase the total area in which they controlled.2 Due to increased 
competition rulers began extracting resources from individuals within the controlled 
territory; redistributing capital to aid in the development of standing armies that could 
enforce internal and external security. State formation in Europe therefore centred on four 
broad conditions: neutralizing competitors within the territory controlled by the rulers; 
deterring rivals through war making; the protection of allies inside and outside the 
controlled territory; and resource extraction that could support the first three activities.3  An 
unintended consequence of these conditions was that of the development of state 
structures and, ultimately, the formation of states. 
In applying Tilly’s arguments to the contemporary environment of the developing 
world there are a few caveats that need to be accounted for. The first deals with the 
environment in which Tilly describes: the pre-state environment of early modern Europe. 
Through competition and coercion, mechanisms of control were developed and provided a 
hierarchical order which permitted instances of domination and subjugation within an 
overarching anarchical environment. Similarly, this is evident during the Lebanese Civil War 
when the state collapsed and the various militias acted in manners similar to the pre-state 
Europe. The development of competition between the militias necessitated coercive 
measures that both protected territorial and economic gains and controlled the populations 
within those territories. The competitive environment that developed after state collapse 
was one that parallels the anarchic environment of pre-state Europe. With no central 
control, the militias of the Civil War were playing a game of domination and subjugation. 
The second caveat is concerned with the controversial notion that all wars make 
states and all states make wars. This is a gross misreading of Tilly and he does not claim that 
the phenomenon of war inherently means that new states will emerge. That does not, 
however, negate the fact that state transformation can be informed by interstate war. One 
way in which the state can go through a transformation caused by interstate war in the 
contemporary period is the strain that is exerted on the national economies of warring 
states. The pressure of funding war can increase capital extraction by governments, placing 
the burden on its citizens. Additionally, it is unlikely that once the war has ended that 
taxation rates will return to pre-war levels.4 This could affect the state through increased 
demands by its citizens in regards to structural changes and increased welfare 
programmes,5 potentially changing the character of the state.  
The third area of contention in applying Tilly’s argument to the contemporary period 
is that the generation of, and focus on, cities that aided in the accumulation of capital and 
buttressed war-making activities; a component that played an important role in the 
transformation of polities into states.6 In the case of Lebanon, the division of Beirut into East 
and West and their subsequent domination could be argued as the establishment of two 
capitals – which until today remain geographically isolated due to poor and corrupted 
attempts of urban reconstruction and regeneration. Nevertheless, Beirut is a prime example 
of uneven economic development and securitization that occurred during and after the Civil 
War, similar to the uneven economic development of the European state during its 
formative years.  
The fourth area that requires addressing is the issue of identity formation and the 
role of identity in the formation of states. While Tilly alludes to the nation and national 
identity through the use of the term ‘national states’, he does not overtly discuss identity 
formation in Coercion, Capital, and European States. The role of identity emerges in a 
subsequent discussion titled ‘Armed Force, Regimes, and Contention in Europe since 1650’ 
in which Tilly asserts that without the strategic use of connections – described as social 
groupings of individuals – the base of support for the rulers would be formed primarily by 
the capitalists. Specifically, Tilly argues ‘Creators of effective states used their coercive 
means to draw resources from their capitalists in exchange for protection of commerce. But 
they also employed moderately centralized webs of connection to integrate subject 
populations into their state enterprises through stable indirect rule.’7 Drawing links from 
histories of nationalism, the use of connections to integrate populations under a ruler 
provides the cornerstone for social identities to develop.8  
Applying Tilly, So Far 
Detractors of the thesis of war and state formation and its application to the developing 
world argue that it cannot be applied for a variety of reasons including, environmental 
realities of population densities, geography, and systemic issues of globalisation and 
international norms. Jeffrey Herbst who examines the pre-state environment in Africa 
argues that because of its ecology and low population densities, rulers found it difficult to 
broadcast power and gain the loyalty of populations. This negates the conditions for state 
formation through territorial conquest as it meant fewer instances of prolonged social 
contact and competition.9 Herbst is correct in asserting that pre-state wars in Africa did not 
produce similar outcomes to those in Europe because of divergent conditions. And in such 
cases, where conditions are not similar enough to produce similar outcomes, as experienced 
by Europe, the framework cannot be applied.  
While Herbst examines the pre-state conditions of Africa, Brian D. Taylor and Roxana 
Botea examine the effects of state building and capacity on interstate war, using the US 
intervention in Vietnam and the Soviet Union’s intervention in Afghanistan as case studies. 
Taylor and Botea find that in the case of Vietnam the combination of war and revolution 
provided an environment that fostered a unifying ideology and combined nationalism.10 
Interestingly in this case, Taylor and Botea examine the effects of interstate war and focus 
on the state that is having its territorial sovereignty breached. In the case of Vietnam, there 
was a clear centralisation process that occurred in response to the US intervention; 
however, this was not apparent in the case of Afghanistan.11 The application of Tilly’s war 
and state formation argument to these cases fails to produce positivist findings. However, 
the findings from this study unveil the important link between interstate war and internal 
state capacity; an argument that has been explored by other scholars.12 Additionally, the 
thesis regarding war and state formation is not concerned with interstate war, but conflict 
between non-state polities, specifically the cases of pre-modern Europe. Whereby the 
conflict between non-state polities over contested territory provided rulers with the ability 
to make territorial gains and renegotiate and impose state-like structures of capital 
extraction, redistribution and the slow development of standing army.  
In response to the application of Tilly’s thesis to interstate war, Andrea Leander 
argues that interstate war in the contemporary environment does not ‘make states, but 
rather unravels them’ because of an international shift to exogenous forms of state 
building.13 Similarly, Cameron G. Thies and Lingyu Lu fail to see how Tilly’s thesis can be 
applied to the contemporary Middle East; arguing that “both interstate and civil wars 
greatly damaged state building.”14 Moreover, despite increased extraction of capital during 
periods of external and internal pressure by domestic and international rivals, the effects of 
redistribution did not follow the patterns of Western Europe.15 The arguments laid out by 
Leander, Thies, and Lu, although compelling, fail to apply the framework to cases that evoke 
similar conditions to which Tilly describes. This creates a problem of theoretical and 
empirical logistics in which a framework is applied to a case that does not fulfil the 
conditions of the theory or framework.  
George Sorensen also contends that the argument ‘war makes states’ does not 
apply;16 and in the cases where war has occurred - the countries have often been left worse 
off. Sorensen argues that because of norms of national sovereignty, many of the developing 
states that use force are unconstrained and are free to do as they please, while the issue of 
time is an unknown. Moreover, he states that developing areas are hindered from becoming 
strong states under Tilly’s model because the nature of war in pre-state Europe was 
differentiated by the global context concerning sovereignty, international public law, 
intervention, responsibility to protect, and domestic conditions relating to the quality of 
leadership.17 These are valid rationalisations for the thesis that Tilly’s explanation of state 
formation cannot be applied to developing world states. Nevertheless, Sorensen is too rigid 
when applying international norms and international public law, which are often breached 
and are rarely applied if more powerful actors have specific interests and gains to reap 
through unlawful interventions. Problematically, Sorensen treats individual conflict during 
pre-state Western Europe as if it were in a black box without the help of allegiances and 
self-interested third parties. Additionally, he fails to distinguish between internal civil 
conflict and interstate warfare; the former being integral to understanding the effects of 
war on state formation, while the latter could produce a variety of other outcomes.  
Many of the academics who explore the possibility of applying Tilly’s, or a Tilly-esc, approach 
to the developing world argue that the temporal realities of international politics are a factor that 
works against the thesis of state-making through war-making. Additionally, they take the 
phenomenon of war as the independent variable which affects state formation, when in fact, war 
and the preparations of war should be analysed as an intervening variable which facilitates 
processes of capital extraction and redistribution, the development of the monopolisation of 
coercion, and the settlement of statehood through domination or negotiation.  
Tilly Applied to Lebanon 
Tilly’s account of European state formation begins with an anarchic environment containing 
various competing and allied groups seeking to secure territories within their domain and 
expand their control outwards. Given the similarities of the pre-state condition to the 
environment of state collapse during civil war, the Lebanese Civil War emerges as a 
plausible invocation of Tilly’s argument. The Lebanese Civil War is characterised by an 
environment of anarchy and self-help. In such an environment, groups are, in competition 
for resources and power. Using the variables to measure state fragility, weakness, and 
collapse outlined by Robert Rotberg, it is apparent that the late 1960’s and early 1970’s in 
Lebanon displayed an overwhelming sense of internal instability. Widespread social 
discontent over wages, cost of living, disparaging work conditions, and unfavourable 
amendments in labour legislation provoked confrontations with the state security forces. 
The violent encounters with the state laid the foundations for numerous autonomous 
groups to emerge and challenge the state as well as each other.18 Eventually, these groups 
eroded state power over a plethora of economic and political issues, aiding in the 
emergence of a system of internal anarchy that exploited societal divisions. The 
environment of the Lebanese Civil War has therefore provided the rudimentary conditions 
and variables necessary to apply Tilly’s model of state formation.  
The institutionalisation of identity politics and sectarianism prior to the outbreak of the Civil 
War provided the militias with the capitalists and social connections necessary for exploitation and 
domination.19 Because of the institutionalisation of divergent identities within the Lebanese state 
prior to the Civil War, once the state dissolved, so did the loyalty of its citizens. The identity driven 
divisions that are highlighted in accounts of the Lebanese Civil War were not a production of 
the Civil War, but were pre-existing fractures robustly institutionalised during the French 
Mandate (1920-1943). The effect of the Civil War on these identities was the facilitation and 
strengthening of sectarian structures and sectarian antipathies driven by the need to 
capture the state and secure the survival of the group.20 Security and survival through 
domination became a driving force for hierarchical organisation. An outcome of this 
hierarchical organisation was the bolstering the particular histories that reinforce notions of 
otherness;21 consequently using the myths as a rallying point to legitimise their pursuit of 
the state.22 As each group stressed its distinct cultural and religious characteristics and their 
right to state power, they became more inward looking. With the capture of the state in their 
sights, the militias began to ratchet up the discourse of an existential threat and thus the need for 
protection by amassing weapons and capital.23 While this occurred primarily at an elite level, attacks 
against populations gave way to stronger feelings of animosity at the domestic level; helping to fuel 
the Civil War into a protracted fifteen year conflict. In exchange for security, citizens gave 
material and symbolic support to the militias that formed after the state collapsed. Thus 
creating what Tilly calls connections between power wielders and their social base of 
support.24  
The internal dynamics at the beginning of the Civil War led many of the militias to 
consolidate and professionalise within the first year.25 Similar to the environment described 
by Tilly, consolidation and professionalization of the militias provided the structure 
necessary to concentrate the use of force over a given territory and population. The modern 
environment of the Lebanese Civil War, in comparison to pre-state Europe, provided a gross 
imbalance that is not accounted for in Tilly’s description. While Tilly does discuss the 
importance of alliances during war-making that aided in the consolidation of the state,26 the 
formation of internal and external alliances in the case of the Lebanese Civil War hindered 
any possibility of a single group acquiring a monopoly of force.   
During the Civil War militias impaired the national economy by creating localised 
subsistence economies. The elites, who led the militias, or those who provided economic 
capital and other material resources to their favoured group (the capitalists), developed a 
series of illicit economic practices, including hidden economic transactions and the use of 
violence for short-term economic gains.27 Mimicking the dynamic that Tilly describes in pre-
state Europe, protection was offered to the communities that the militias represented and 
controlled, in return, resources were extracted, often by force. Unlike the conditions of pre-state 
Europe, these militias also received remittances from abroad,28 making it difficult for any single 
group to obtain a monopoly. Since capital from abroad was flooding the country, there appeared to 
be a near never-ending reservoir of funds that problematised the status of each militia relative to 
their competitors. Towards the end of the Civil War the surviving militias were deadlocked in a 
mutually hurting stalemate,29 preventing any single group to gain an advantage through the use of 
force. 
Those who captured wealth during the war transformed their groups into exploitative 
organisations to finance their greed for power. It is well documented that the Phalangist (Kataeb) 
Militia, the Marada Movement, and the Lebanese Forces were involved in the illegal operations such 
as opening Pier Five at the Beirut Sea Port, exporting hashish from the Bekaa Valley, developing their 
own taxation systems, and establishing compulsory military service. The need to secure these 
resources in an effort to capture the state instigated protracted violent conflict. For the Shiite 
community, historically poor and disenfranchised, a call to arms was made by communal leaders 
who suffered from unfavourable conditions of the years before the Civil War.30 What emerged from 
the economic environment during the Lebanese Civil War was a new class of capitalists who 
professionalised the trade of contraband and armaments. The new profiteers created an 
unprecedented level of disorder, and they lacked the political finesse of the pre-civil war feudal 
system, including its established social network. They were, therefore, unable to maintain the same 
level of social cohesion as the old guard; ultimately, resulting in greater schisms between the poor 
and the elites.31 The new capitalists profited from their associations with the militias while those 
from the lower economic classes greatly remained connected through the provision of security and a 
vague social order.  
The social order that developed was one of connections. The warlords of the Civil 
War aimed to maintain capital extraction to support their activities and make territorial 
gains in hopes to capture and consolidate the state vis-à-vis a game of elimination. To do so, 
the militias had to take predatory postures against the populations they pledged to 
protect.32 This predatory posture coupled with mutually beneficial relations with capitalists 
ensured social organisation under the command of the militias while making territorial gains 
against their enemies. The collapse of the state, the subsequent development of strong 
organisations based on sectarian divisions, and the ability to collect resources and capital 
provided militias with permanent programmes of conflict.33 
As the militias were attempting to consolidate their power over territory, Syria, 
Israel, Iran, and the US were all vying for their favourite groups to gain the upper hand; 
having direct consequences on the Civil War environment. Syria outwardly asserted that its 
ambitions were that of peace, however, the commands of Syrian President Hafez al-Assad 
proved otherwise. With the approval of Lebanese President Suleiman Franjieh, Syria 
deployed 25,000 troops into Lebanon in May 1976. The Syrian troops helped defeat the 
Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO) and allied leftist militias, while solidifying the 
sectarian divisions within the state. The initial accomplishments of the Syrian deployment 
led the Arab League to authorise the Syrian army to act as an ‘Arab Deterrent Force’, a 
mandate that was later extended in 1879.34 In the meantime, Israel began opening its 
northern borders to the Maronite villages, and provided weapons to the Druze populations 
in the mountain ranges, in hopes to form alliances and inject its influence.35 Syria, 
unbeknownst to the Maronites, the US, and Israel, used this opportunity to become a 
dominant force within the Lebanese Civil War, constantly and consistently shifting alliances, 
and supplying various groups with direct military aid. While Syria was actively mediating 
between the Lebanese factions after helping defeat the PLO, al-Assad was also sending 
troops from the Palestinian Liberation Army out into battle under his command.36 With such 
powerful players making enormous alliance changes and thus pulling the strings during the 
civil war, it became even more difficult for any one group to acquire and maintain a 
monopoly of force and secure significant territorial gains. 
Although the argument can be made that intervention was necessary to limit sectarian-
driven human rights violations, it can also be stated that the funds and military means aided in the 
violation of human rights by prolonging the conflict. It can be argued that state formation, as 
outlined by Tilly, following the Civil War failed because of the saturation of capital and the ever 
increasing means of coercion; the ability to neutralise competition through territorial gains became 
almost non-existent and perpetuated a system of sabotage rather than domination. Attempts to 
gain a concentration of capital and the monopoly on the use of force during the Lebanese Civil War 
devolved into a zero sum game. Large amounts of capital flooded the Civil War economic system and 
negated many of the advantages that leaders were able to obtain; too many external actors had 
stakes in the outcome of the war and the survival of specific groups; and no single group was able to 
capture the state despite producing state-like structures and mechanisms such as professionalised 
militias, taxation, and redistribution.  
Despite the similarities in the environment such as overall anarchy and violent competition 
with the aim of capturing territory, contemporary state collapse presents problems that were not 
existent in the analysis of the pre-state environment. These problems include external intervention 
and economic and military assistance. What was first viewed as a quick conflict to change the status 
quo of the state turned into a prolonged civil war due to the intervention of external actors and 
materials. The environment created during the Lebanese Civil War prevented any single group or 
coalition of groups to capture and secure the state. These differences in environmental conditions 
from those of pre-state European polities, at first sight, obstructed the type of state formation that 
Tilly describes. However, in exploring the Civil War and the consolidation of the state afterwards, 
especially in the case of Lebanon, it is possible to maintain the argument that given the right 
conditions Tilly’s framework of war and state formation applies to non-European states.  
The significance of stalemate and the Ta’if 
The realities of the Lebanese Civil War, namely the inability for any single group to capture the state, 
forced the competing militias into a stalemate which was broken with the negotiation of the Ta’if 
Accords in 1989. The negotiation of the Ta’if accords was an event that included the militias involved 
in the fighting and external parties that held strategic interests in the formation of stable Lebanese 
state. Because no single party successfully captured the state, the stalemate became a reality that 
threatened to exhaust the militias economically and coercively. Due to the inability of a single group 
to dominate, the state was renegotiated between the fighting factions of the Civil War, enabling a 
process of state formation that would suit the interests of the elites holding the reigns of the warring 
parties.  
The Ta’if Accord set the foundation for the formation of the state through a process of 
negotiation; however, Lebanon experienced a drawback following these negotiations: Syrian 
occupation. Following the Civil War, Syria was permitted through a mandate established by the Arab 
League, to occupy Lebanon until stability returned. Its mandate was to ensure stability in the period 
immediately after the Civil War and to slowly withdraw from the Lebanese political landscape once 
political stability returned to the state. In reality, Syrian occupation was maintained for fifteen years. 
The occupation brought the Lebanese political environment to a stand-still, hindering political 
evolution and development; during this period Lebanon was a defacto client state.
37 
Upon Syrian 
withdrawal in 2005 after the assassination of former Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri on February 14, 
2005, the Lebanese state began a process of rebalancing that, at times, looked perilous. 38    
After the Syrian Withdrawal: 2005-2013 
In order to qualitatively measure Lebanese state formation, we must consider the contemporary 
period to which Lebanon exists and functions. In other words, a careful study of the state in its post-
war context will help establish to what extent the phenomenon of war had on state formation. Since 
the Civil War, Lebanon – even under Syrian occupation – has been considered a weak state due to 
political and economic corruption, a devalued national currency, deeply entrenched divisions within 
the state institutions as well as society, and regular outbreaks of violence.39 The divisions that are 
still present in the post-Syrian period are fostered at the level of the national government through 
the political parties that reign from the Civil War. At the heart of the divisions is a lack of consensus 
over the character of the Lebanese state. The result has been the continued generation of inward 
looking discourse by various political actors resulting in blind opposition to unity and conciliation. 
Despite these divisions, there are projects and movements at a national level that unintentionally 
encouraged cooperation amongst the elites; at a grassroots level individuals and social groups have 
challenged popular discourse and narratives of the other. Although such instances of elite 
cooperation and the challenges directed at divisive political rhetoric set the foundation for an 
optimistic outlook, the state services (military, education, media, social welfare etc) remain highly 
politicised and divided.  
The politically influenced media stations and education boards that have perpetuated 
notions of the other through the construction of narratives that have their roots in the Civil War are 
only two of a wider set of politicised services. The provisions and distribution of welfare services and 
legal protection along sectarian and political divisions have slowly begun to erode, the continued 
distribution of services based on sectarian and political divisions have become contentious ground in 
the eyes of Lebanese citizens.40 The contemporary private media also has its origins in the Civil War, 
yet, emerging in parallel to the media are higher levels of political critique.41 Despite the media 
outlets not being state sanctioned during the Civil War period, the post-Civil War stations that have 
received state licences offer a continuation of highly politicised rhetoric.  The licencing of media 
outlets in the post-Civil War period were limited and granted to individuals with vested interests in 
Lebanese state politics. Licences were given to the late Prime Minister Rafiq al-Hariri who owned 
Future Television; Speaker of Parliament Nabih Berri who controlled the National Broadcasting 
Network; and former Interior Minister Michel Murr who controlled Murr Television (better known as 
MTV).42 The channels target those with specific political alliances and views, a problem that is also 
prevalent in the developed world; similarly to various global media landscapes, the media often 
becomes the vehicle for political messages. However, this continues to impact the Lebanese state 
through the reiteration and continuation of discourses that were fostered during the Civil War. In 
doing so, the media risks positioning itself against growing political sentiments emerging from 
grassroots organisations and a society that is increasingly becoming internationalised. Much like 
media practices elsewhere in the world, the divisive political discourse helps entrench political 
divisions by providing ideological interpretations of events. On the other hand, the entrenchment of 
political divisions in the case of Lebanon stirs memories of the Civil War period.  
 The education system is another aspect of the state that has maintained its divisions 
along similar lines inherited from the Civil War. Though there are schools that provide 
politically unbiased education regarding the formation of a national discourse concerning 
identity and the history of the Lebanese people, these schools are inclined to the children of 
upper-middle class urban professionals. Families who are unable to take advantage of, or who 
do not agree with this type of education are compelled, or choose, to enrol their children to 
inflexible and dogmatic teachings within the sector of private sectarian schools or be required 
to send their children to state schools. Students who receive religious private education 
through sectarian schools are not encouraged to think critically or discuss politics in any 
form. They are rarely educated on other religions outside of their own and are educated to 
turn to their religious leaders for protection and social welfare. While the private secular 
schools are abundant, they are expensive and geared towards the educated upper and upper 
middle class economic strata. On the other hand, the public secular schools are notorious for 
their poor quality of education and infrastructure.
43
 Because the religious private education is 
heavily subsidised by political parties or religious charities, they are a popular choice for low-
income families.
44
 Politicians and political parties notoriously buttress the private religious 
schools ensuring that the schools espouse the rhetoric of their financial supporters. Due to the 
politically lucrative establishment of the sectarian based education system, the public sector 
remains in dire need of attention.  
 At a grassroots level, there has been a push to construct a national narrative of 
reconciliation and national identity. Some of these projects have questioned the sectarian 
divisions directly, including a commercial by Byblos Bank, and the film by Nadine Labaki 
titled Where Do We Go Now? The commercial sponsored by Byblos Bank titled Ana 
Loubnani (I am Lebanese) asks the question “When do we become Lebanese?” after a 
sequence of individuals stand in front of the Lebanese flag and proclaim their religion.
45
 The 
film by Nadine Labaki addresses the issue of otherness through a story of one village whose 
men are divided amongst sectarian lines due to external pressure from within the country. 
The women in the village take it upon themselves to try to keep the communities together, 
and when all else fails, they swap their religion to show that they are, in fact, the same.
46
 The 
sentiments regarding the state of the Lebanese state are echoed in the short film directed by 
Ziad Oakes and produced by Khalil Khatib called A Lunch with Lara Khoury. In the film, a 
group of young, Lebanese, professionals sitting down for lunch are asked to describe 
Lebanon in one word. Some of the words used to describe the state include “schizophrenic,” 
“chaos,” “beautiful,” and “home.”47 The emphasis on identity within the culture industry is 
trying to fill a void that has been entrenched by the politicians and their overarching interest 
to maintain their seats of power. This void drives the divergent notions of what it means to be 
Lebanese while attempting to establish a narrative of a single identity; one that has emerged 
from a history of conflict. 
 These grassroots movements have continued to have an impact on the state; altering 
the relationship with and the expectations of the state. In one case, a women’s rights 
organisation, Nasawiya, was throwing a goodbye party for one of their members on the 
evening of the 28 June, 2013 when the private security forces of Minister Nadim Gemeyal, 
son of Bachir Gemayel, entered the building to shut down the party. The members of 
Nasawiya were held at gunpoint for two hours and when they went to the police station the 
next day to report the incident they were subsequently arrested and detained. The demand for 
their release was fulfilled once the police, perceived as clients of Gemayel, discerned that the 
civil protest, growing as news of the events spread, would not back down.
48
 While state 
corruption is still very much present and impacts all levels of statehood from the elites, to 
services, and society, there has been growing vociferousness and social movement in the 
aftermath of the Syrian withdrawal. The case surrounding the Nasawiya protests in 2013 
exemplifies two shifts in state-society relations. The first is the slow changing relationship 
society has with the state: a decreased feeling of fear within society in protest movements and 
political opposition. It also highlights a problem that has remained from the Civil War period 
the struggle for the state to maintain a legitimate monopoly over the means of coercion.  
 The Meqdad family is an example of a family run militia that impacted the Lebanese 
state by overshadowing state coercion. In August 2012, Syrian rebels in Lebanon kidnapped 
Hassan al-Meqdad. The Meqdad family quickly organised their clan’s militia wing and 
undertook reprisals, resulting in the kidnapping of twenty Syrians and a Turkish national. 
Within hours of the organisation being called forward to retaliate against the kidnapping, 
other groups within Lebanon took advantage of the evolving anarchic environment by 
organising ad-hoc militias for protection. Maher al-Meqdad, the family patriarch, was 
arrested in September,
49
 and is quoted as saying: “[W]e don’t consider ourselves above the 
law, but when there is no state, like now, then we need to protect ourselves.”50 Although 
Maher al-Meqdad felt that the state was absent or non-existent, the state was quickly able to 
reassert its authority and al-Meqdad, along with complicit members of the family, were later 
arrested and charged for forming a militia and the abduction of foreigners.
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 Despite the ability of the state to regain control over the means of coercion and 
reassert its position during periods of crises, the means of state coercion are indeed highly 
politicised through the chain of command and recruitment patterns. In 2013 discussion 
regarding the fractionalisation of the security forces became a topic of discussion with the 
Internal Security Forces (ISF) being perceived as a client of Sunni interests run by Sunni 
politicians.
52
 Evidence of fractionalisation is not only exemplified in recruitment processes 
and command, in 2006 there was a growing critique of the ISF and their mismanagement of 
the Cartoon Riots that led to the destruction of the Danish embassy in Beirut.
53
  Alternatively, 
the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) is widely seen as a client to the Christian parties in 
general and the Maronite encampment more specifically.
54 
While the argument can be made 
that the politicisation of the state security forces is evidence of state weakness, it can also be 
viewed as an institutional step in building sectarian confidence and trust. Through elite 
cooperation over the security of the various segments of the population, trust can be slowly 
institutionalised.
55
 One example of how this trust has worked out is demonstrated by the LAF 
and ISF controlling and neutralising circumstances of internal dissidence, including the 
fighting that occurred at the Nahr al-Bared refugee camp in 2007.
56
 This exhibits the 
importance placed on developing a government controlled security force since the end of the 
Civil War. Although both security services are highly politicised, they do serve the Lebanese 
state.  
 The politicisation of the state security forces has also helped to reinforce Hezbollah’s 
position within the state as a resistance force.  In the case of Hezbollah, as they were slowly 
brought in to the legitimate Lebanese political framework, their radical characteristics 
softened over time. Having since been officially declared as a resistance force in Lebanon, 
they have – for the most part – remained within these confines. In one particular instance on 7 
May, 2008, Hezbollah took Beirut by force in protest over a governmental decision to remove 
their telecoms systems.
57
 The use of force by Hezbollah was seen as an attack against the 
civilians with some commentators calling it a ‘breaking point’ and a potential return to civil 
war in Lebanese politics.
58
 The threat of heightened sectarian divisions and discontent over 
such a short period of time prompted each side to eventually back down. While it is portrayed 
that the ‘breaking point’ was a lit fuse to further civil conflict, it also meant that the ruling 
coalition in the government would have to work with other parties in order to gain internal 
stability. On the other hand, it also established the rule that the country cannot, literally, be 
held hostage at gunpoint to the political will of a single party without facing political loss of 
support.  
 The increasingly evident new order in state-society relations, the growing power of 
grassroots organisations, and the increasing trust across sectarian boundaries in the 
management of state security have been positive steps towards the development of a strong 
Lebanese state. That is not to say that the reformulation, renegotiation, and development of 
Lebanon have been easy. An analysis of the Lebanese economy exhibits lacking methods of 
extraction and redistribution of capital, which, as some argue, has permitted the continuous 
corruption and politicisation of the economy by fortifying sectarian enclaves.
59
 A probable 
explanation for this is the increase of oil rentier capital that flooded the post-war economic 
environment; creating a real-estate bubble in certain districts of Beirut and increasing the 
discrepancy between the rich and the poor. Both the inflation of real-estate prices and the 
disparities between the rich and poor are problems that have yet to impact the Lebanese 
government due to the welfare programmes and services offered to the needy by political and 
sectarian parties.
60 
These welfare programmes offered by sectarian groups and political 
parties help buttress the divisions within the socio-political environment and increase social 
impetus for individuals to sell their political loyalty in exchange for basic goods such as 
healthcare, education, electricity, water, and waste management.
61
 The method of distribution 
of these services works for the moment; however, it leaves the central state with a fault line: 
uneven economic development and no central method of alleviating the state from this 
potential political tipping point.  
 The evidence of uneven development and the lacking centralisation of capital can be 
observed when the total percentage of depositors is compared to the total percentage of 
deposits owned by depositors. In 1992, 2.4% of the depositors owned 40% of the total 
deposits, compared to depositors in 2002 where 2.4% of total depositors owned 60% of the 
total deposits.
62
 However, deciphering this data is quite difficult because of the increasing 
gross domestic product (GDP) per capita, which grew from 5,499.9 U.S. dollars in 2006 to 
9,705.4 U.S. dollars in 2012.
63
 In addition to a growing GDP per capita, the Lebanese gross 
national income (GNI), a figure which includes income earned by Lebanese nationals abroad 
and expressed in national purchasing power parity (PPP) grew from 40.7 billion U.S. dollars 
in 2006 to 53.4 billion U.S. dollars in 2009;
64
 showing great increases in the total income 
purchasing power per capita since the end of Syrian occupation. Nevertheless, the number of 
depositors versus the number of deposits indicates that wealth has not been redistributed. The 
state has been unable to capture domestic capital and the influx of foreign capital from these 
deposits because the state has inadequate methods of extraction.
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 Despite the positive growth of wealth, as of 2007, approximately 21% of the Lebanese 
population is considered poor and 8% is considered extremely poor; figures which have not 
changed since 2004-2005.
66
 The percentage of those living in poverty works out to be 
roughly 1.2 million Lebanese citizens who are considered poor or extremely poor by 
international standards. This raises questions regarding the lack of demands directed towards 
the state concerning the redistribution of capital amongst those living in poverty. This is an 
important point as many academics continue to look at abject poverty as a source of political 
mobilisation.
67
 Arguably, despite the state not being in a position to offer social welfare 
programmes that are available through the central governments in most Western states, the 
political elites, parties, and sectarian groups have been able, and willing to, fill the void; 
offering, in exchange for political support, goods and services to individuals, who otherwise 
cannot afford to take part in the neo-liberal economic market.
68
 This is an act of balance that 
is quietly consented to by the government and the actors within government. While it does 
not benefit a centralised state apparatus it has helped in the acquiescence on Lebanese 
statehood.   
 Conclusion 
Charles Tilly argues that war and the preparations for war unintentionally brought about the 
state in Europe. War required rulers to gain access to funds that could support their efforts 
and establish a standing army that would remain loyal. It meant protecting the territorial 
dominion of the ruler and assuring that the population consented to be ruled either through 
legitimacy or force. While the state in Lebanon did not form in the exact pattern that Tilly 
describes, the consequences of civil war in Lebanon have been that of state formation. 
 The onset of the Civil War gave way to an environment of internal anarchy that led to 
increased competition by warring factions. As the war progressed, the factions 
professionalised into militias, mimicking standing armies, while developing methods of 
capital extraction and redistribution in order to support their efforts and maintain a soft 
consent from the population. Due to the circumstances of the war, including external 
intervention and the influx of foreign capital, the warring factions were eventually locked into 
a mutually hurting stalemate. As it became clear that such conditions were no longer stable, 
the Lebanese state consolidated through a process of negotiation between the surviving 
militias and intervening members of the international community.  
 The negotiations following the Civil War led to the Ta’if agreement, an agreement 
that was never fully implemented due to the ongoing Syrian occupation, nevertheless, it 
contributed to the consolidation of the state. Upon Syrian withdrawal, the state, as per the 
Ta’if agreement began to develop. While there are continued problems, including issues 
regarding capital extraction and redistribution within the central state apparatus, there has 
been growing focus on the legitimate monopoly of force and increased pressure from the civil 
society on the government and state institutions to provide legitimate services. Arguably this 
established state-society relations over political issues that are often made out to be plaguing 
the state of Lebanon.  
 With the looming history of Civil War influencing instances of political deadlock, the 
state in Lebanon has become much more amenable to compromise amongst its diverse 
population and their representatives. While Lebanon shares characteristics similar to the pre-
Civil War period because of the character of its population, it is also vastly different in terms 
of structure. Although Lebanon did not and has yet to centralise into a state that parallels the 
central capacity of France or Britain, it does maintain many similarities with the development 
and emergence of Switzerland.
69
 These similarities include civil conflict along with external 
pressures that consolidated the state – allowing it to be renegotiated and developed through 
democratic practices such as civil protest. 
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